State v. Troutman Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 35033 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-9-2009
State v. Troutman Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
35033
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Troutman Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35033" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2021.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2021
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
j 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 35033 
) 
MAURICE RONALD ) 
TROUTMAN, ) REPLY BRIEF 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
-1 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 1% 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
. * ., . , . . . 
. , , .. ,, 
. ... , . . . 
:.,- , ,  HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General 
State of ldaho Criminal Law Division 
I.S.B. # 4843 P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
SARA B. THOMAS (208) 334-4534 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 6247 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ldaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
................................................................................ STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
Nature of the Case ...................................................................................... 
Statement of the Facts and 
............................................................................... Course of Proceedings 2 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 4 
......................................................................................................... ARGUMENT .5 
....................................... The Prosecutor's Misconduct Warrants A New Trial .5 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................ 5 
B. Standard Of Review And Other Applicable 
....................................................................................... Legal Standards .5 
C. The Prosecutor Engaged In Numerous Acts 
Of Misconduct ........................................................................................ 7 
I. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Asking 
The Jury To Draw Inferences Which She Knew To 
Be False And Were Wholly Inconsistent With The 
State's Theory In Another Case, And By Doing So 
For The Purpose Of Prejudicing The Jury Against 
Mr. Troutman ......................................................... 
2. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Distorting 
Mr. Troutman's Defense, Asking The Jurors To Convict 
Mr. Troutman In An Effort To Cure Societal Problems 
And Out Of Fear For Their Own Safety (Or The Safety 
Of Others), And By Seeking To Reduce The State's 
Burden Of Proof .................................................................................. 12 
3. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Attempting 
To Generate Sympathy For Ms. Schillereff AndlOr 
Derision For Mr. Troutman .................................................................. 16 
4. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Attacking 
..................... Mr. Troutman's Credibility Based Her Own "Testimony" 18 
5 . The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Asking The 
Jury To Convict Mr . Troutman Based On A Presumption 
Of Rape AndlOr In An Effort To Change Existing 
"Lenient" Cultural Views Regarding Sex ............................................. 19 
D . The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This 
....................................................... Case Constitutes Fundamental Error 20 
..................................................................................................... CONCLUSION 22 
............................................................................... CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 23 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Nguyen v . Lindsey. 232 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir . 2000) .............................................. 11 
........................................... . Sfafe v Babb. 125 Idaho 934. 877 P.2d 905 (1994) 21 
State v . Corfez. 135 Idaho 561, 21 P.3d 498 (Ct . App . 2001) ............................. 19 
State v . Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007) .............................................. 5 
.......................................................... State v . Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 71 P . 608 (1903) 9 
. . ............................ State v . Marfinez, 136 Idaho 521, 37 P.3d 18 (Ct App 2001) 18 
.......................................... State v . Porter. 130 Idaho 772. 948 P.2d 127 (1 997) 17 
......................................... State v . Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) 21 
. .......................... United States v . Weatherspoon, 41 0 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir 2005) 15 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Maurice Troutman was charged with a single count of rape after having had sex 
with a woman at the Grove Hotel in Boise. The State's theory was that the alleged 
victim was either unconscious at the time, or unable to resist, due to her ingestion of 
alcohol and a prescription sleeping aid, Ambien. The alleged victim had very little 
recollection of the sex with Mr. Troutman. 
Mr. Troutman's defense was that the sex was purely consensual, the alleged 
victim was an active participant, and the fact that the alleged victim simply did not 
remember it did not make it rape. In support of this defense, he presented evidence 
that one of the side effects of Ambien is that people using it can appear wide awake and 
fully functional at times during the night, but have no recollection of the night's activities 
the following morning. This phenomenon is known as intro grade amnesia. 
Ultimately, however, a jury found Mr. Troutman guilty and the district court 
imposed a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. 
Mr. Troutman timely appealed. On appeal, he contends that, throughout her 
opening, closing, and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor in his case engaged in 
numerous acts of misconduct which, whether considered individually, or in the 
aggregate, constitute fundamental error entitling Mr. Troutman to a new trial. In 
response, the State argues that Mr. Troutman "has failed to establish error, much less 
fundamental error, in relation to any of the prosecutor's statements." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.9.) In support of this proposition, it addresses each of Mr. Troutman's claims in 
turn, arguing in each instance that no misconduct was committed (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.13-28), and then it concludes by briefly asserting that Mr. Troutman's Appellant's 
Brief failed to offer any argument in support of his contention that the prosecutor's 
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error (Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29). 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to point out where the State has 
mischaracterized the prosecutor's arguments in an effort to make them appear proper, 
and where it is mistaken as to the law. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincls 
The procedural history of this case was accurately detailed in Mr. Troutman's 
Appellant's Brief. Because that summary of the procedural history of the case was 
sufficient for purposes of the present appeal, no further discussion of the procedural 
history is necessary at this time. 
Likewise, the factual history of this case was accurately summarized in 
Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief. Thus, further discussion of the facts is not strictly 
necessary at this point. However, because the State's attempt to highlight certain facts 
may have created a misleading picture of the trial evidence, a brief further discussion is 
prudent. 
First, in describing events occurring in the hours leading up to the alleged rape, 
the State discusses the fact that, after Ms. Schillereff had taken an Ambien pill and gone 
to bed, Ms. Relano (accompanied by the Blitz player she ultimately spent the night with) 
returned to the hotel room she had rented with Ms. Schillereff to change her clothes. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.2.) While these are accurate statements about the evidence, it is 
worthwhile to point out that the State has omitted the fact that, while Ms. Relano and the 
football player were in the room in the middle of the night, Ms. Schillereff was awake 
and functional, and even took a picture of her friend kissing the football player, but had 
no memory of that event in the morning. (See Tr., p.100, L.18 - p.101, L.18, p.132, 
L.21 - p.134, L.10, p.140, L.10 - p.143, L.7; see also Exs.15 & 15A (picture taken by 
Ms. Schillereff).) Obviously, these facts support the inference that the Ambien caused 
intro grade amnesia such that, although awake and functional, Ms. Schillereff simply 
could not remember some of what she did on the night in question. 
I 
I Second, in describing the alleged rape, the State describes some of the evidence 
I 
I regarding Detective Brechwald and Detective Vucinich's interrogations of Mr. Troutman, 
I 
I asserting that the evidence was that Mr. Troutman admitted that he initiated physical 
I 
1 contact, Ms. Schillereff mumbled something incoherent, and then he penetrated her 
I 
I from behind. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) Again, while these are accurate statements on 
I 
I the State's part, they are somewhat misleading because of the information omitted by 
I 
I 
I the State. In fact, according to Detective Brechwald's testimony, as well as the 
I 
transcript of the interrogation with Detective Vucinich, Mr. Troutman also maintained 
that, after he lay down next to Ms. Schillereff, he woke her up, whereupon she "scooted 
her buttocks over towards his groin area and started grinding on him," and that she not 
only unzipped Mr. Troutman's pants and helped him remove them, but removed her 
own pants and, later, while the couple was having sex, changed positions such that she 
was on top of him. (Tr., p.457, L.25 - p.458, L.16; Ex. 22A, p.12, Ls.5-16; see also Ex. 
22A, p. 19, Ls. 1-4 (transcript of interrogation with Det. Brechwald, wherein Mr. Troutman 
again described Ms. Schillereff as having been on top of him during sex).) Obviously, 
I these facts undercut the State's attempt to portray Ms. Schillereff as a virtually 
I 
I unconscious victim. 
ISSUE 
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct depriving Mr. Troutman of due  process of law 
and a fair trial, such that h e  is now entitled to a new trial? 
ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor's Misconduct Warrants A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Troutman raised five distinct claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct arising out of the prosecutor's closing arguments. He argued that, not only 
were many of the prosecutor's comments improper but, whether considered individually 
or in the aggregate, they were so egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error. 
In response, the State argues that, not only was there no misconduct that was so 
egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error, but there was no misconduct at 
all. For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State is wrong on both points. 
B. Standard Of Review And Other Applicable Lesal Standards 
The standard of review applicable to prosecutorial misconduct claims (de novo 
review) was identified in Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief (p.8), and it does not appear 
that the State takes issue with that standard. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) The 
State does, however, go on to make a curious claim as to the legal standard applicable 
to claims of prosecutorial misconduct committed during closing arguments. This claim 
warrants further discussion. 
In reciting the legal standards applicable to claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
during closing arguments, the State implies that misconduct committed during that 
stage of the trial is less likely to warrant relief for the defendant because the prosecutor 
is less culpable for his misconduct due to the "improvisational nature" of closing 
arguments. (See Respondent's Brief, p.1 I.) Specifically, the State cites State v. Field, 
144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007), for the proposition that "[tjhe ldaho 
Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of reviewing closing arguments in 
light of their improvisational nature . . . ." (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Such an 
argument, however, is meritless. First, it defies logic, as there is no reason to believe 
that closing arguments are any more improvisational in nature than any other portion of 
a trial, such as the examination of a witness. Second, even assuming that the 
prosecutor's closing argument is particularly improvisational, the Field Court certainly 
did not "recently reiterate[ ] the importance of reviewing closing arguments in light of 
their improvisational nature," as the State now claims. In fact, Field involved a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct committed in the questioning of a witness, not during closing 
arguments. Field, 144 at 571-72, 165 P.2d at 285-86. Third, the State fails to explain 
how, if, as it argues elsewhere in its brief, "the touchstone of due process analysis in 
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability 
of the prosecutor" (Respondent's Brief, p.10 (quoting Smifh v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 
219 (1982))), it should be entitled to any leeway because the prosecutor's statements 
were made "on the fly" and the prosecutor was, therefore, less culpable. In other words, 
the State's prayer for leniency is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court 
precedent and overlooks the fact that the crux of Mr. Troutman's prosecutorial 
misconduct claim is that he was denied due process and a fair trial by the prosecutorial 
arguments in question. Accordingly, contrary to the State's claim, the State ought not to 
be cut any slack simply because the prosecutor may have been improvising when she 
made arguments that had the effect of denying Mr. Troutman a fair trial. 
C. The Prosecutor Enaaqed In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct 
1. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct Bv Asking The Jury To Draw 
Inferences Which She Knew To Be False And Were Whollv Inconsistent 
With The State's Theory In Another Case. And Bv Doing So For The 
Purpose Of Preiudicina The Jury Aaainst Mr. Troutman 
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.8-14), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when she argued as follows: 
At 4:53 a.m. we know that room has been entered a second time. I 
don't have to prove if there was a rape or theft there, because the victim is 
unconscious. She is unaware these multiple entries are happening. She 
doesn't know who is coming into the room, to tell us again at 5:09 a.m., 16 
minutes later, the room is entered again. 
The same key card the defendant had in his possession. That key 
card never went back to [Ms. Relano] and was never placed back into the 
room, so he had it, and he says he handed off to a third party unknown to 
the victim. Okay? 
So either he [Mr. Troutmanl or someone that he designated, bv 
passing it along, is aoing into that room again. And that happens, a 
second entry happens. Again, don't know if there is rape or theft 
happenina aaain. 
[The key card] again is used one hour later. There is a fourth entrv. 
Again, do not know what other crimes were committed aaainst this woman 
durina that time frame. We do know at some point the iPod was taken 
from the room. Her other luggage was searched. The wires that go with it 
are taken out of the room as well, and again, I don't know-that's a side 
issue. I don't know if Mr. Troutman did that bevond a reasonable doubt or 
if his buddy that he passed the card to did that, but I do know that 
Mr. Troutman returned it all to the front desk when he knew the police was 
[sic] on them, and he would be getting caught. 
All of that, mere inability to know who's in there, how many times he 
is coming in, she is not aroused. She is not awakened. She does not 
know, and she does not even realize a theft has happened, because she 
is that unaware and sedated and unconscious and helpless. 
And their repetitive entering into the room obviously speaks 
squarely to the point of her ability to be able to appreciate the nature of the 
act, which is penetration in this case. 
(Tr., p.642, L.5 - p.643, L.20 (emphasis added).) Mr. Troutman contends that this 
portion of the prosecutor's closing argument was improper because, as the underlined 
portions make clear, it sought to have the jury infer that Mr. Troutman entered 
Ms. Schillereffs hotel room to victimize her on mulfiple occasions, even though the 
prosecutor knew (based on both the trial evidence and the outside evidence) that, of the 
four entries to Ms. Schillereff's room during the relevant timeframe, Mr. Troutman 
entered only once, and that Mr. Reynolds entered the room the other three times. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-14.) Specifically, Mr. Troutman asserts that the prosecutor's 
implication constituted misconduct for three reasons: it sought to have the jury draw an 
inference that the prosecutor knew to be false; it was inconsistent with the evidence 
within and outside the case; and it was clearly calculated to prejudice the jury against 
Mr. Troutman. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.) 
In response, the State provides a number of reasons why the above-quoted 
argument is, in its view, perfectly acceptable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-20.) First, the 
State claims that "the clear import" of the prosecutor's argument was that the fact that 
there were multiple entries to Ms. Schillereff's hotel room indicates that she was 
unconscious and, thus, unable to have consented to sex with Mr. Troutman during the 
first entry. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15 (emphasis added).) However, while that 
could certainly be said to be the clear import of a portion of the above-quoted argument 
(the two paragraphs beginning with "[all1 of that"), it most certainly is not the clear import 
of the statements tending to raise the inference that Mr. Troutman had been the one to 
re-enter the room and victimize Ms. Schillereff repeatedly. 
Second, the State asks this Court to believe that the prosecutor did not commit 
misconduct because she did not know for certain that Mr. Troutman did not re-enter 
Ms. Schillereff's hotel room. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) The problem, however, is 
that under this reasoning, a prosecutor could make any wildly speculative argument, 
even if all of the evidence suggests that that argument is false, and then hide behind a 
claim that she did not know for sure what the truth was because she was not there to 
personally see what happened. Surely prosecutors are held to a higher standard than 
that. See, e.g., Sfafe V. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, -, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903) ("Nothing should 
tempt [the prosecutor] to . . . make statements to the jury which, whether true or not, 
have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce [the prosecutor] to 
endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in 
the case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same . . . ."). 
Third, the State now defends the inference it asked the jury to draw by 
speculating that Mr. Troutman could have re-entered the room with Mr. Reynolds at 
some point. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) However, this is rank speculation on the 
State's part. The best the State can do to support this speculative argument is point to 
one portion of the grand jury transcript where one of the detectives, while being asked 
about Mr. Reynolds' interrogation, testified that "I believe that he mentioned a camera" 
while discussing what he saw the first time he entered Ms. Schillereff's room. (Grand 
Jury Tr., p.168, Ls.14-21.) The State tries to reason that, since there is evidence that 
Mr. Troutman took Ms. Schillereff's camera (see Tr., p.216, Ls.8-24), but Mr. Reynolds 
might have seen a camera in Ms. Schillereff's room after Mr. Troutman had left, 
Mr. Troutman must have gone back with Mr. Reynolds to take the camera during a 
subsequent entry to the room. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) This, however, is 
far from a reasonable inference, especially since the grand jury testimony summarizing 
Mr. Reynolds' admissions to the police makes it quite clear that entered Ms. Schillereff's 
room alone on three occasions. (See Grand Jury Tr., p.164, L.20 - p.175, L . l l  
(repeatedly using the word "he," not "they," while referring to Mr. Reynolds' entries into 
Ms. Schillereff's hotel room, thus making it clear that Mr. Reynolds told the police, or at 
least implied, that he had acted alone on those occasions).) Moreover, as if the State's 
"logic" is not tenuous enough on its face, one must remember that the State did not 
even seek an indictment against Mr. Troutman for any successive entries into the hotel 
room, much less get an burglary indictment for any such entry.' (See R., pp.11-13.) 
Rather, the State went after Mr. Reynolds for the re-entries, seeking indictments on two 
counts of burglary for the second and third (of the four) entries in question (see 
R., pp.12-13), the two instances where he admitted entering the room with the intent to 
have sex andlor steal (see Grand Jury Tr., p.165, L.22 - p.172, L.20).' The bottom line 
I With regard to Mr. Troutman, the State sought an indictment on one count of rape, and 
one count of burglary. (See R., p.12.) Presumably, the burglary count, since it alleged 
the intent to commit a rape or a theft, related only to Mr. Troutman's readily-admitted 
entry into the room, Le., the first of the four entries in question. (R., p.12.) However, 
even if that burglary count was intended to be broad enough to cover any entry by 
Mr. Troutman into the room, the reality is that the grand jury did not find probable cause 
of any burglary. (See R., p.12.) Accordingly, it is clear that the grand jury rejected the 
notion that Mr. Troutman ever entered Ms. Schillereff's room with the intent to commit a 
crime, which surely would have had to have been the case had he re-entered the room 
after having sex with Ms. Schillereff. 
' Apparently, the State did not seek an indictment for Mr. Reynolds' third entry (see 
R., pp.12-13), the fourth of the night, where he told the police he did not know why he 
went in the room (see Grand Jury Tr., p.172, L.21 - p.173, L.17). 
is that there is no reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Troutman ever re-entered 
Ms. Schillereff's room after the visit where he had sex with her. 
Fourth, turning its focus away from the evidence and onto the law, the State 
seeks to distinguish the cases cited in Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief in support of the 
proposition that a prosecutor cannot offer inconsistent theories as to how a crime was 
committed. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) In making this attempt, the State focuses 
on the facts that: (a) Mr. Reynolds did not take his case to trial and, instead, entered 
into a plea agreement; and (b) Mr. Troutman and Mr. Reynolds were ultimately 
convicted of different offenses. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) However, the State 
presents two distinctions without any meaningful differences. The triallplea distinction is 
meaningless because the fact is that, since the State obtained a conviction of 
Mr. Reynolds based on the claim that he was the one who re-entered Ms. Schillereff's 
room on numerous occasions, it ought not to be allowed to turn around and obtain a 
conviction of Mr. Troutman on the theory that he was the one who re-entered the room 
(especially where, as noted above, the prosecutor knew all the evidence suggested 
otherwise). Likewise, the different offense distinction is meaningless because, although 
Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Troutman were not ultimately convicted of the same offense, the 
fact is that they have both lost their liberty based on the prosecutor's manipulation of the 
evidence. 
Fifth, the State points to language in Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 
2000), to the effect that "trial preparation is not a static process," arguing that this Court 
would have to ignore that truism in order to find misconduct in this case. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.18.) However, the State's argument is misleading since the above-quoted 
portion of Nguyen appeared as part of a larger discussion of how new evidence coming 
to light between one case and the next will justify inconsistent positions. Nguyen, 232 
F.3d at 1240. In this situation though, there is no allegation that conditions changed, or 
that new evidence came to light, between the grand jury proceedings and 
Mr. Troutman's trial, or between Mr. Troutman's trial and Mr. Reynolds' guilty plea. 
Finally, as a point of clarification, the State mistakenly asserts that Mr. Troutman 
has claimed a violation of ldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Respondent's Brief, p.19.) 
This is not so. In fact, as should have been clear from Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Troutman contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by using the false 
inference that Mr. Troutman had made repeated entries into Ms. Schillereff's room to 
prejudice the jury against Mr. Troutrnan. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) In making this 
argument, Mr. Troutman cited Rule 404(b) merely to show that ldaho law recognizes 
that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts (besides that those that are charged) 
is potentially highly prejudicial to the defendant. (See Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
2. The Prosecutor Enaaaed In Misconduct Bv Distortina Mr. Troutman's 
Defense. Askina The Jurors To Convict Mr. Troutman In An Effort To Cure 
Societal Problems And Out Of Fear For Their Own Safetv (Or The Safety 
Of Others). And Bv Seekina To Reduce The State's Burden Of Proof 
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.15-20), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when she began her rebuttal argument with the following 
comments: 
[H]e would have a done deal if, based on this argument, we are all going 
to have to put heavy locks on our doors, on the windows in our house and 
wear chastity belts when we go to bed, because in case you are lawfully 
ingesting any substance that makes you unable to fend for yourself and 
the next day you can't remember much about what's happened, but the 
law enforcement has done their absolute best and has figured out the 
criminal involved and the crime that's committed, you are at fault, and 
there is no crime. 
Under this suggestion, if your house door is unlocked and a person 
walking by decides that they are going to check all the doors in the 
neighborhood in the middle of the night and see who's got something they 
can take, comes into your house, and you happen to have taken a 
sleeping pill, or whatever, or are just a really heavy sleeper and someone 
comes through your house, take everything you have and goes, "Hey, 
buddy, I'm taking your car," and you don't wake up, and he leaves. 
When he is caught later, he is going to go, "I was in his house. It 
was unlocked. He didn't tell me I couldn't come in." 
And then I said to him, "Dude, I'm taking your car, and he doesn't 
remember, and he did not follow the warnings on the Ambien he was 
taking that said don't mix it with alcohol, that's his fault." 
When you start shifting the blame in a case like this onto the victim 
for her inability to remember every detail of what she was doing behind 
her locked door, in her own bedroom, in her own bed, then you are turning 
the world upside down. Justice not in its real sense, but what conceptual 
sense is. 
(Tr., p.665, L.2 - p.666, L.15.) He argued that this misconduct continued, when a short 
while later, the prosecutor argued as follows: "People who are victimized, you cannot 
blame them later that they may have a mental illness, maybe they have Alzheimer's. 
This means that those folks are open target. They might not know what happens to 
them, because they can't remember tomorrow what happened." (Tr., p.670, Ls.5-10.) 
Specifically, Mr. Troutman asserts that these arguments distorted and mischaracterized 
Mr. Troutman's defense, exhorted the jury to convict based on a desire to cure a greater 
societal problem andlor out of fear for themselves or others, and sought to reduce the 
State's burden of proof. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-20.) 
in response, the State offers a number of arguments, none of which has any 
merit. First, ironically enough, the State accuses Mr. Troutman of a mischaracterization; 
it claims that his description of the prosecutor's closing argument is "false" insofar as he 
argued that it mischaracterized his trial defense as one of "I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I 
took that as a 'yes."' (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) The State claims that "[njowhere in 
the arguments cited by Troutman, and excerpted above, did the prosecutor characterize 
the defense in this manner." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) However, once again, the 
State is being less than honest. As quoted above, the prosecutor tried to scare the jury 
with a hypothetical situation involving a heavy sleeper who had all of his belongings, 
including his car, taken, and then she warned that "[wjhen he [the perpetrator] is caught 
later, he is going to go, "I was in his house. It was unlocked. He didn't tell me I couldn't 
come in." (Tr., p.665, L.15 - p.666, L.3.) Clearly, the intent with this hypothetical was to 
mischaracterize the defense in this case as one of "I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I took 
that as a 'yes,"' and then portray the precedent that would be set if Mr. Troutman were 
to be acquitted. 
Second, the State asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the above-quoted 
arguments "simply urged the jury to reject Troutman's argument that the jury could not 
find him guilty because Heather could not remember whether the sex was consensual." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.21-22.) However, this attempt re-cast the prosecutor's rebuttal 
argument in terms that would not be considered improper is quite disingenuous. The 
above-quoted argument was much more than a simple plea to focus on the 
circumstantial evidence in the case. By conjuring up images of a world where decent 
citizens need "heavy locks" and "chastity belts" to protect themselves from home 
invaders, the prosecutor engaged in an unabashed attempt to frighten the jurors into 
convicting Mr. Troutman out of fear for their safety, the safety of their friends and loved 
ones, and the safety of society as a whole. As such, this portion of her argument was 
plainly improper. 
Third, although the State specifically attempts to refute the foregoing argument, 
asserting that "[tlhe prosecutor was not, as Troutman suggests, urging the jury to 
convict Troutman to 'alleviate' a 'societal problem[ ]'-she was using an analogy in 
response to describe the practical effect of the defense's theory of the case" (alteration 
in State's brief; footnote omitted), and then asserting baldly that "[tlhis is not improper" 
(Respondent's Brief, p.22), the reality is that even if this argument was not clearly belied 
by a plain reading of the prosecutor's argument, the State's current argument in defense 
of the prosecutor demonstrates that her rebuttal argument was, in fact, improper. 
Indeed, even the State concedes that the prosecutor sought to portray "the practical 
effect" of an acquittal; however, the "practical effect" of an acquittal, i.e., how and 
acquittal in this case would affect future cases or society as a whole, should not have 
factored into the jury's decision-making process in this case; the jury should have been 
concerned only with the evidence in the case at hand. As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held, arguments such as those that were made here run the risk of causing 
a conviction "for reasons wholly irrelevant to [the defendant's] own guilt or innocence. 
Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convicting a defendant, 
they will assist in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of 
society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear."3 
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Notably, in its Respondent's Brief, the State feigns ignorance, claiming that it cannot 
figure out what "societal problem" Mr. Troutman has argued that the prosecutor 
improperly sought to have the jury concern itself with. (See Respondent's Brief, p.22 & 
Fourth, the State denies that the portion of the above-quoted argument which 
implied that law enforcement had done "their absolute best" and had found "the 
criminal" was an attempt to lower the State's burden of proof by essentially vouching for 
law enforcement's opinion that Mr. Troutman is guilty of a crime. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.22-23.) The State defends the prosecutor's comments as "an assertion that the jury 
was not required to acquit Troutman simply because [Ms. Schillereffj could not 
'remember much about what[ ] happened"' (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23 (quoting 
prosecutor's closing argument).) However, if that truly had been the prosecutor's intent, 
there was no need to discuss law enforcement at all, much less imply that it had done 
its "absolute best" and caught "the criminal" because the manner by which the 
investigation is handled is completely irrelevant to the question of whether a conviction 
can be had despite Ms. Schillereffs faulty memory (unless, of course, the prosecutor 
was trying to frighten the jurors with a parade of horrible societal repercussions of a "not 
guilty" verdict). 
3. The Prosecutor Enqa~ed in Misconduct BV Attempting To Generate 
Svmpathv For Ms. Schillereff And/or Derision For Mr. Troutman 
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.17-18 & n.7, pp.20-23), Mr. Troutman argued that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct when she repeatedly employed tactics that were 
clearly calculated to engender sympathy for Ms. Schillereff and resentment toward 
Mr. Troutman. With regard to the tactics intended to generate sympathy for 
Ms. Schillereff, the State argues that the prosecutor's tactics "hardly constitute 
n.6.) Obviously, the societal problem that Mr. Troutman referred to (and, indeed, the 
societal problem that the prosecutor sought to have the jurors be concerned with) was 
the problem of home invasions involving sex crimes and thefts. 
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misconduct," and that, even if the prosecutor did engage in misconduct, "it is unlikely 
the prosecutor's characterizations of [Ms. Schillereffl and her experience further 
influenced the jury to convict Troutman." (Respondent's Brief, pp.23-24.) Since these 
are conclusory arguments on the State's part, no further response is necessary; 
Mr. Troutman's Appellant's Brief and the trial transcript speak for themselves. 
With regard to the tactics intended to generate resentment toward Mr. Troutman, 
the State argues that, because the evidence underlying the arguments in question was 
in the record, it was perfectly acceptable for the prosecutor to highlight that evidence in 
any fashion she so chose during her closing argument. (Respondent's Brief, p.24.) 
However, there are two significant flaws with this argument. First, as noted above, 
there was no evidence in the record to support the prosecutor's claim that Mr. Troutman 
had repeatedly entered Ms. Schillereff's room, repeatedly assaulted her, or took her 
iPod. Second, the fact that a certain piece of evidence is in the record does not give the 
prosecutor license to argue that the jury should consider that evidence for an improper 
purpose. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997). In this case, 
the fact that Mr. Troutman did not use a condom when he had sex with Ms. Schillereff 
was wholly irrelevant to any fact that was at issue in this case; it was only in the trial 
record at all as part of the res gestae of the case. Accordingly, the prosecutor's 
decision to highlight that fact repeatedly during her closing arguments, and to do so in 
the manner in which she did,4 was clearly an attempted to appeal to the passions and 
prejudices of the jury and, as such, was plainly improper. 
In a comment that was clearly an attack on Mr. Troutman's character, the prosecutor 
argued first that "[hle did not care enough to protect who he is going to have sex with." 
(Tr., p.650, Ls.4-6.) Later, in a comment that was both an attack on his character, and a 
4. The Prosecutor En~aoed In Misconduct By Attackina Mr. Troutman's 
Credibilitv Based Her Own "Testimony" 
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.23-24), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when she essentially made herself a witness when she 
interjected new evidence (her own life experiences) into the case during her closing 
argument by stating "I am yet to hear from a single woman who has done that-this is 
anecdotal from him-that there are women who have sex with multiple members at one 
time, willingly have sex with multiple members at one time . . . ." (Tr., p.652, Ls.1-9.) In 
response, the State attempts to characterize the prosecutor's comment as possibly 
relating to the evidence presented (or not presented, as the case may be) by the 
defense at trial, not her own life experiences. (Respondent's Brief, p.25.) This 
argument, while creative, is unconvincing since the prosecutor said she had "yet to hear 
from a single woman who" would be willing to engage in sexual activity with a number of 
professional football players. The word "yet" implied that she might still hear from such 
a woman in the future and, since the prosecutor surely knew that all the evidence had 
been heard (such that no such woman could be called to testify in Mr. Troutman's case) 
by the time she began her closing arguments, she must have meant that she had "yet" 
to hear from such a woman in her own life. Thus, it is reasonably clear that, as 
Mr. Troutman argued in his Appellant's Brief, the prosecutor interjected her own life 
experience into the case, which was improper. See Sfafe v. Marfinez, 136 Idaho 521, 
plea for sympathy for Ms. Schillereff, she made a point of reminding the jury that "[slhe 
[Ms. Schillereffj has to take protective measures later to make sure she doesn't get 
pregnant by him or she doesn't get all the things that come along with unprotected sex 
she doesn't know about." (Tr., p.669, Ls.6-11.) 
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525, 37 P.3d 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 566, 21 P.3d 498, 
503 (Ct. App. 2001). 
5. The Prosecutor Enaaqed In Misconduct Bv Asking The Juw To Convict 
Mr. Troutman Based On A Presum~tion Of R a ~ e  And/or In An Effort To 
Change Existina "Lenient" Cultural Views Reqardina Sex 
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.24-26), Mr. Troutman argued that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when, while discussing her assertion that Mr. Troutman had 
stolen Ms. Schillereff's camera, she launched into a discussion about how, "I don't know 
what it is about our culture . . . we give more importance to someone taking a tangible 
thing from us without our permission, but we are more lenient about the issue of 
someone having sexual penetration. . . . [wi th sex, we are willing to sort of go into the 
realm of unreasonable, unfortunately." (Tr., p.656, Ls.9-24.) Mr. Troutman argued, 
inter alia, that this argument mischaracterized the defense as being one of "she didn't 
say 'no,' so it's not rape"; effectively sought to lower the State's burden of proof by 
implying that, without express permission, the sex between Mr. Troutman and 
Ms. Schillereff was necessarily non-consensual; and exhorted the jury to find 
Mr. Troutman guilty in order to change, or at least make a statement against, societal 
views about sex which the prosecutor feels are too lax. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-26.) 
In response, the State devotes much energy to useless disparagement of 
Mr. Troutman's argument. (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-28.) However, it does argue, in 
part, as follows: 
[I]t is certainly apparent when the entire argument is read in context 
that the prosecutor was not urging the jury to presume anything or to be 
more sympathetic to the prosecution based on "cultural norms." Rather 
she was highlighting that there is no distinction between taking a piece of 
property without someone's permission and taking something more 
personal and intimate without their permission. This is improper. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28.) With this argument, the State does actually raise a 
valid point: it probably would not have been improper for the prosecutor to have argued 
simply that there is no distinction between taking personal property and raping 
someone, in the sense that they have been deemed criminal by the Idaho Legislature. 
Unfortunately, the prosecutor did not confine her argument to that in this case; here, she 
argued about cultural norms, society's "lenient" treatment of cases involving "sexual 
penetration," and society's willingness "to sort of go into the realm of unreasonable, 
unfortunately," in cases involving sex, and she asked the jury to make a statement 
against society's "lenient" norms by convicting Mr. Troutman. (Tr., p.656, Ls.8-24.) 
Thus, despite the State's attempts to re-characterize the prosecutor's closing argument, 
it cannot conceal the fact that it was an improper appeal to convict Mr. Troutman based 
on matters outside the evidence-namely, a desire to ameliorate society's woes. See 
Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149. 
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes 
Fundamental Error 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Troutman conceded that none of the instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct complained of were objected to by trial counsel, but argued 
that this Court should nonetheless consider his claims on their merits because the 
instances of misconduct in question, "whether considered individually, or in the 
aggregate, constitute fundamental error because so much of [the misconduct] was 
calculated [to] inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury and influence the verdict 
with matters outside the evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Since the nature of 
the individual instances of misconduct had already been discussed elsewhere in his 
Appellant's Brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.8-26), it was unnecessary to again describe 
the instances of misconduct or the reasons why those instances of misconduct 
constituted emotional appeals and other arguments to have the jury decide the case on 
matters outside the evidence in the section of his Brief discussing the fundamental error 
standard. 
In response the State attempts to procedurally default Mr. Troutman's 
fundamental error argument. Citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 
970 (1996), the State claims that this Court cannot even reach the fundamental error 
question because "Troutman has failed to present any argument on this point . . . ." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29.) This argument is frivolous for two reasons. First, 
Mr. Troutman's fundamental error argument is not a claim for relief; it is an argument in 
support of all of his claims. Thus, Zichko does not even apply in this instance. Second, 
even if Zichko does apply, Mr. Troutman's fundamental error argument was, in fact, 
supported by argument (however brief that argument might have been). (See 
Appellant's Brief, p.28.) 
The reality is that the fundamental error analysis in the present case is quite 
straightforward: the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to draw certain inferences in 
an effort to generate resentment toward Mr. Troutman; she tried to generate sympathy 
for Ms. Schillereff; she repeatedly sought to have the jury decide the case based on fear 
or in order to vindicate or, in one case, make a statement against, societal norms; and 
she repeatedly distorted Mr. Troutman's defense. Under these circumstances, it is clear 
that the misconduct was "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion 
or prejudice against the defendant, or [was] so inflammatory that the jurors may [have 
been influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence," State v. Babb, 125 
Idaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994), and, thus, meets the criteria for fundamental 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Troutman respectfully requests that the judgment of conviction in this case be 
vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this gth day of April, 2009. 
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